Dwong asks an important question: Like denying they’re a hipster, modal collapse arguments are what all the hipster theologians are about these days, failing to recognize how thoroughly the issue has been dealt with by philosophers who had no penchant for pascal colored hair or messy comb-overs:
How is there not a distinction in God between God's will and ideas if God only wills to create this world and not other worlds even though both this world and other world's can exist in God's ideas or thoughts?
Thank you Pat for responding to my question. This makes sense to me. I definitely agree that the Anscombian account of agency applies to God, especially when realizing that God does not think discursively or in a succession of thoughts. Since His knowledge is simple and the very object of His knowledge is the Divine Essence itself, the idea of mental events preceding His actions would be repugnant in a two-fold manner:
1) It seems to be anthropomorphizing the Divine Intellect (positing a 1:1 correspondence between the human intellect and the Divine intellect, thus neglecting analogical predication)
2) It is a failure to recognize that God being in eternity prevents a succession of actions, meaning something being temporally prior or posterior.
However, this article has raised some new questions for me. Would you or Gaven say that Anscombe's account of agency only applies to God, or do you think it also extends to man? To me, intuitively, the Davidson account seems to apply to creatures because it seems as if my actions are preceded by mental events which cause me to act. I haven't read or thought about this at length and am definitely interested in how one would argue for an Anscombian account of agency in creatures.
I also think I had an insight while reading the part of this article where you discuss the fallacy of accident. It appears as if many causal agents in the created realm change while realizing an effect simply due to their limitations. For example, if I were to punch you, it is true that the action is in the patient, namely the "hitting is in you", but there is also a change in the agent, namely the change of my parts, while realizing the effect. This change only occurs because of my physical limitations of being bounded at a specific place and time. The physical location of my parts change, due to the fact that I must actualize my parts to extend them for the power to "flow forth" and reach you. The reason why agents in the created realm change when realizing an effect is due to their own limitations - which is another way of saying that changers who are composed of act and potency change while realizing their effects. However, since God is Pure Act, this rule inductively abstracted out of the created order pertaining to beings who are composites of act and potency has no weight against God, since He does not contain potency.
How is there not a distinction in God between God's will and ideas if God only wills to create this world and not other worlds even though both this world and other world's can exist in God's ideas or thoughts?
Thank you Pat for responding to my question. This makes sense to me. I definitely agree that the Anscombian account of agency applies to God, especially when realizing that God does not think discursively or in a succession of thoughts. Since His knowledge is simple and the very object of His knowledge is the Divine Essence itself, the idea of mental events preceding His actions would be repugnant in a two-fold manner:
1) It seems to be anthropomorphizing the Divine Intellect (positing a 1:1 correspondence between the human intellect and the Divine intellect, thus neglecting analogical predication)
2) It is a failure to recognize that God being in eternity prevents a succession of actions, meaning something being temporally prior or posterior.
However, this article has raised some new questions for me. Would you or Gaven say that Anscombe's account of agency only applies to God, or do you think it also extends to man? To me, intuitively, the Davidson account seems to apply to creatures because it seems as if my actions are preceded by mental events which cause me to act. I haven't read or thought about this at length and am definitely interested in how one would argue for an Anscombian account of agency in creatures.
I also think I had an insight while reading the part of this article where you discuss the fallacy of accident. It appears as if many causal agents in the created realm change while realizing an effect simply due to their limitations. For example, if I were to punch you, it is true that the action is in the patient, namely the "hitting is in you", but there is also a change in the agent, namely the change of my parts, while realizing the effect. This change only occurs because of my physical limitations of being bounded at a specific place and time. The physical location of my parts change, due to the fact that I must actualize my parts to extend them for the power to "flow forth" and reach you. The reason why agents in the created realm change when realizing an effect is due to their own limitations - which is another way of saying that changers who are composed of act and potency change while realizing their effects. However, since God is Pure Act, this rule inductively abstracted out of the created order pertaining to beings who are composites of act and potency has no weight against God, since He does not contain potency.